A POSTSCRIPT ON VMI
ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER7

In the summer of 1996, the Supreme Court announced its decision
in United States v. Virginia] with a flurry of publicity. The Court, in a
highly controversial ruling, held that male-only Virginia Military
Institute (VMI) had to open its doors to women. Additionally, the
Court ruled that Virginia could not maintain two sex-segregated
educational institutions with different programs, resources and
alumni networks. 2 After several months of uncertainty, VMI decided
to comply with the Supreme Court's ruling by admitting women, at
the same time announcing that it will also hold female cadets to the
identical shaved head and "rat-line" standards as the male cadets.' In
accord with the decision in the fall of 1997, VMI had 30 female cadets
in the fall 1997 freshman class.'
The decision of the Court is an important victory for women's
rights, both because of what it does and because of what it appears to
preserve. The decision has already bee the subject of extensive scholarly analysis.' As a postscript to my comments at the Centennial
Panel,6 however, I want to briefly highlight three aspects of the decision: the language of the majority opinion concerning the standard of
scrutiny for gender-based classifications, the contradictions concern* Professor ofLaw, Brooklyn Law School.
1. United States v. Virginia, 116 S. CL 2264 (1996) [hereinafter "VMF].
2. Jeffrey Rosen, Single-Sex Schools andDouble Standards,N.Y. TIMES,July 3, 1996, atA23.
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ing the meaning of gender "difference" that are reflected in the opinion, and the implications of the opinion for public single-sex
education for women.
The majority opinion, written by Justice Ginsburg, carefully but vigorously rejected VMI's claims. However, the language of the opinion
was elusive on the precise standard of review that the Court applied.
Justice Ginsburg uses two phrases to characterize the standard: gender-based classifications must meet an "exceedingly persuasive
justification,"7 and the state's actions in establishing gender-based
classifications must be viewed with "skeptical scrutiny."' The opinion
stated that "[t]he heightened review standard our precedent establishes does not make sex a proscribed classification,"9 but that "case
law evolving since 1971 'reveal[s] a strong presumption that gender
classifications are invalid."".. The opinion noted that "[t]he Court has
thus far reserved most stringent judicial scrutiny for classifications
based on race or national origin, but ... observed that strict scrutiny
of such classifications is not inevitably 'fatal in fact."'. The Court did
not "[equate] gender classifications, for all purposes, to classifications
based on race or national origin," but points out that the Court has
recently paid careful attention to actions which deny opportunities
based on sex.'"
There are several different ways of interpreting these statements.
The majority opinion did not overtly embrace "classic" strict scrutiny
as the standard of review for gender-based classifications as the Justice
Department and other amid argued. Parsing the language of the
opinion raises questions concerning the standard of review but does
not provide answers. Two phrases that Justice Ginsburg repeatedly
used to characterize the standard, "skeptical scrutiny" and "exceedingly persuasive justification" are purposely vague. The phrase

7. United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2271, 2274 (quoting Mississippi Univ. Women v.
Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982) andJ.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 136 (1994)).
8. See id. at 2274-75 (discussing the United States history of sex discrimination).
9. See id. at 2276 (stating that there are "inherent differences" between the sexes, but that
these differences should not be used to denigrate either sex).
10. Id. at 2275 (quotingJ.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 152 (1994) (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
11. Id. at 2275-76, n.6 (quoting Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 235-37
(1995)) (emphasis added).
12. United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2275.

13. See id. at 2275 (explaining the Court's presumption that classifications based on gender
are invalid).
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"skeptical scrutiny," used for the first time,14 could be read to characterize either intermediate or strict scrutiny. The phrase "exceedingly
persuasive justification," although used in prior opinions, had not
been used to characterize the state's specific burden under either
standard, but merely to describe the difficulty of demonstrating that
the challenged sex-based classification bore a substantial relationship
to an important state interest." The Court's use of the phrase "thus
far" could be interpreted as restating Justice Ginsburg's prior reservation that strict scrutiny remains an option for sometime in the future,16
or it could be interpreted as the equivalent of "up until now," meaning until this case.
Questions as to whether "classic" strict scrutiny still exists are raised
by the language of the majority opinion, which compared the standard of review for gender with the standard of review for race and
national origin. The Court said that gender classifications and race
and national origin classifications are not equated for all purposes,
but did not clarify for what purposes they are equated. Justice Ginsberg's statement that the Court had "thus far reserved most stringent
judicial scrutiny for classifications based on race or national origin"
was qualified by reference to the Court's suggestion that "strict scrutiny of such classifications is not inevitably 'fatal in fact."' Does this
mean that "classic" strict scrutiny is "watered down" for all three
groups-gender, race and national origin? Are there still three tiers
of equal protection? Finally there are the questions of how to interpretJustice Scalia's claim in his dissenting opinion that the majority
has adopted strict scrutiny, 7 Justice Rehnquist's claim in his concurring opinion that the majority has heightened the standard," and the
majority's silence and failure to rebut this claim in its opinion.
In my comments at the Centennial Panel, I suggested that the Supreme Court's has characterized its treatment of gender issues as
saying one thing in its description of the standard of review and sim14. Indeed, the full sentence in whichJustice Ginsburg introduced this phrase is: "[tioday's
skeptical scrutiny of official action denying rights or opportunities based on sex responds to
volumes of history." Id. at 2274 (emphasis added).
15. See Mississippi Univ. Women v. Hogan, 455 U.S. 718, 724 (1982) (stating the burden to
be met is that the "classification serves 'important governmental objectives'"); Personnel Adm'r
of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256,273 (1979).
16. See Harris v. Forklift Systems, 510 U.S. 17, 26 (1993) (Ginsburg, J. concurring) ("[I]t
remains an open question whether classifications based on gender are inherently suspect.").
17. United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2293-96.
18. See id. at 2288 (Rehnquist, CJ., coinurring)(writing that the Court's insistence that "the
state must demonstrate an 'exceedingly persuasive justification' to support a gender-based
classification ... [i]ntroduces an element of uncertainty respecting the appropriate test.").
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ply doing another in applying that standard.'9 VM!may be interpreted
simply continued this tradition. What the court does in VMis significant, however, what the majority says concerning the standard of
review is elusive.
The Court's language regarding "difference" in race and gender
contexts is more troubling. Justice Ginsburg wrote that "' [i]nherent
differences' are no longer accepted as a ground for race or national
origin classifications,"" but "physical differences between men and
women are enduring."2 ' She continued by stating that "'inherent
differences' between men and women . . . remain cause for celebra-

tion, but not for denigration of the members of either sex or for
artificial constraints on an individual's opportunity."' Thus, several
questions remain: What are "inherent differences" between the sexes?
Are they the same as "physical differences"? What "inherent differences" or "physical differences" between the sexes are acceptable as a
basis for legislative classification? In what circumstances? Which
"inherent differences" are cause for "celebration," and which are
"denigrating"?
This general language concerning "difference" raises questions in
light of both the Court's historic reliance on gender "difference" and
the specific facts of VM. Claims of "physical" and "inherent" differences between men and women historically have been the major
rationale for gender discrimination, and they are the exception to the
concept of equal treatment that often swallows the rule.' Whether
gender "difference" is a cause for celebration or denigration depends
on a complex range of factors: whether gender "difference" is understood to exist outside of a purely biological context, what gender
"difference" is claimed to exist, what "difference" means in a particular context, and whose perspective on gender "difference" is
considered and controls.
Reliance on such general language concerning gender "difference"
is particularly ironic in the VMT opinion, since the case devolved on
disputes over claims of gender "difference" and different interpretations of "celebration" or "denigration." Virginia argued that the
establishment of the separate Virginia Women's Institute for Leader19. See GentennialPane4supranote 6 at 23.
20. United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2276.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. See CentennialPanel supranote 6, at 21-26 (Professor Elizabeth Schneider comments on
gender "difference").
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ship (VWIL) program at Mary Baldwin College "celebrated" "differences" between men and women. Conversely, the Justice Department
argued that VWIL "denigrated" them.
As VMT was decided, another case involving single-sex public education came to the fore. In September 1996, the Young Women's
Leadership School (YMLS), a public junior high school for girls,
opened in East Harlem.24 YWLS' students are primarily Black and
Hispanic. The program emphasizes mathematics and science, subjects in which girls often lag behind boys, and it is based on the
rationale that "studies often show that girls, particularly from poor
neighborhoods, learn better when boys are not in the classroom."'
Much controversy has surrounded this school with feminists divided
on the issue." However, the majority opinion in VMlappeared to view
single-sex schools, like YWLS, that are intended to remedy a history of
subjugation, as different from those like VMI, that continue a pattern
of historical exclusion. The opinion suggested that where the "mission of . . . single-sex schools is 'to dissipate rather than perpetuate,

traditional gender classification,' 2. the state may "evenhandedly
support diverse educational opportunities."'

24. Jacques Steinberg, Planfor Harlem Girls SchoolFaces Concern OverSex Bias, N.Y. TIMEs,July

16, 1996, atAl.
25. Id.

26. See Derrick Bell, Et Tu ACLU,N.Y. TImEsJuly 18,1996, atA23;John Leo, Boys on the Side,
U.S. NEvS AND WoRLD REP. Aug. 5, 1996, at 18; see generally, Carrie Corcoran, Comment, SingleSix EducationAfter VMI EqualProtectionandEast Harlem's Young Women's LeadershipSchool 145 U.
PA. L. REV. 987 (1997).
27. Janine Zuniga, NOW Joins Suit to Halt All-Girls School in Harlem, THE STAR LEDGER,

Newark, NewJersey, Aug. 23, 1996, at 3. Civil rights advocates have fied a Title IX complaint
contending that YWLS is discriminatory. Jacques Steinberg, All-Girls School May Violate Rights of
Boys Officials Say, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 1997, at B1. Federal education officials have not issued a
formal finding of violation but did request that the Board of Education begin negotiating
possible solutions to the problem: 1) either admit boys to YWLS, or 2) establish a separate
program for boys. Id. The matter has yet to be resolved. Jacques Steinberg, Crew Says "No" to
Compromise on All-Girls Middle School N.Y. TIEs, Sept. 25, 1997, at B3.

28. United States v. Virginia, 116 S.Ct. at 2276, n.7 (citing Brieffor Twent,-SixPrivate Women's
Colleges as Amici Curiae5).

29. Id. Significantly, in another footnote, the Court highlighted the difference between allmale and all-female education:
The pluralistic argument for preserving all-male colleges is uncomfortably similar to
the pluralistic argument for preserving all-white colleges .... The all-male college
would be relatively easy to defend if it emerged from a world in which women were established as fully equal to men. But it does not. It is therefore likely to be a witting or
unwitting device for preserving tacit assumptions of male superiority assumptions for
which women must eventually pay.
United States v. Virginia, 116 S.Ct. at 2277, n.8 (quoting C. JENCIKS AND D. RiESMAN, THE
ACADEMIC REVOLUTION 297-98 (1968)).
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VM! is an important case and the majority opinion is a great victory
because of its forthright rejection and analysis of the historic exclusion of women from public education. At the same time, the opinion
signals the continuing nature of the constitutional struggle for gender
equality.

